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ABSTRACT
Harvard professor Samuel P. Huntington has frequently been considered a
Vietnam War hawk. His observation that ‘forced-draft urbanization’ might help
the United States win the war has come to define his engagement in con-
temporary strategic debates. This essay argues that both Huntington’s aca-
demic work and his private policy advice to the U.S. Government in fact urged
a political settlement to the conflict. It argues that in spite of this, Huntington
refused to break publicly with the U.S. policy because of his wider concern
over what he saw as a crisis of authority in the U.S. foreign policy and
governing institutions in the era.
KEYWORDS Vietnam War; Samuel Huntington; counter-insurgency; Nation-building; strategy;
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Introduction
Of the many people whose reputations suffered from involvement in the
agonies of U.S. strategic decision-making during the Vietnam War, Harvard
professor and civilian strategist Samuel P. Huntington stands out. His chief
contribution to the public debate over U.S. strategy in the conflict was a
piece published in the U.S. establishment journal Foreign Affairs in 1968 in
which he appeared to suggest that the forceful depopulation of the South
Vietnamese countryside might be the key to victory in the conflict. In return
he earned the nickname ‘Mad Dog’ among his students and was branded a
war criminal. The radical critic Noam Chomsky wrote that Huntington’s
writings on the war were evidence that ‘[w]e have to ask ourselves whether
what is needed in the United States is dissent – or denazification’.1
Huntington’s critics assumed that he was strongly in favour of the war,
held a simplistic view that it could be won through a brutal policy of forced
urbanisation, and was influential in policy debates. This essay takes aim at all
three of these assumptions.
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1Noam Chomsky, American Power and the New Mandarins (New York: Pantheon, 1969), 17.
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This essay locates the key to understanding Huntington’s involvement in
the Vietnam War in his attempt to juggle the demands of being simulta-
neously a public intellectual, policy consultant and academic. It argues that
Huntington’s attempt to fulfil these contradictory roles led him to take
positions which were often inconsistent with one another. In his academic
writings and in his private advice to U.S. government officials, Huntington
took a pessimistic, dovish and accommodative approach to nation-building
and counter-insurgency strategy in general and the Vietnam War in
particular. But in his public remarks – to journalists, in op-eds and ultimately
in Foreign Affairs – Huntington attempted to act as a cheerleader for the
Johnson administration and its war strategy. This was not just because of his
desire to maintain his status as an insider who could still be heard in the
corridors of power, but also because of his wider concern over what he saw
as a general crisis of confidence in U.S. foreign policy and governing
institutions in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Hewing to his vision of the
proper way for a patriotic, engaged civilian strategist to attempt to aid his
country, he declined to join the waves of anti-war protest which swept
U.S. campuses during these years. The irony was that even though
Huntington’s posture led to opprobrium being heaped down upon him
within academia, it did nothing to enhance his influence in government.
Viewed as an irredeemable hawk in Harvard Yard and an irredeemable dove
in Washington D.C., Huntington’s attempt to juggle his competing roles
ultimately failed.
This essay places Huntington in the context of his intellectual milieu.
Unlike many intellectuals in this period, ranging from the anti-war left to
neoconservatives who viewed the Vietnam War as a distraction from the
superpower competition, Huntington engaged deeply with the details of
U.S. strategy. Like Henry Kissinger, Huntington was intensely concerned with
the tactical details of how the United States would extricate itself from the
war. This contrasted with neoconservative intellectuals who, Kissinger later
complained, were ‘bored’ by tactics and ‘discerned no worthy goals for
American foreign policy short of total victory’.2 As Eric Kaufmann has writ-
ten, Huntington – like Kissinger – was ‘too realist’ to embrace
neoconservatism.3 Like Kissinger, Huntington was also deeply concerned
with the collapse in the authority of American domestic institutions which
he believed accompanied the anti-war movement. Both men shared an
interest in a Vietnam War policy which would gradually filter the poison of
the conflict out of the national bloodstream while maintaining the cred-
ibility of American commitments to its allies. For Huntington, the concern
with political order, stability and authority which marked his academic work
2Henry Kissinger, ‘Between the Old Left and the New Right’, Foreign Affairs 78 (May/June 1999), 110.
3Eric Kaufmann, ‘The Meaning of Huntington’, Prospect Magazine, Feb. 2009.
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gave shape to his views on both the Vietnam War and U.S. domestic politics
during this period. This in turn meant he inevitably clashed with an aca-
demic anti-war movement which saw the Vietnam War overwhelmingly in
moral rather than practical strategic terms and viewed with abhorrence
Huntington’s attempt to remain an insider in policy debates, with all the
contradictions and compromises this inevitably entailed.
An understanding of Huntington’s intellectual and policy-oriented
response to the challenges of U.S. strategy during the Vietnam War also
has broader implications for the history of and future of strategy.
Huntington’s critique of U.S. policy in these areas deserves greater atten-
tion than it has received in the shadow of his inflammatory comments in
Foreign Affairs. The history of Huntington’s involvement in Vietnam War
debates also resonates at a time when the lines between strategist, public
intellectual and consultant are being increasingly blurred in the modern
media environment, as the careers and writings of individuals such as
David Petraeus and David Kilcullen have demonstrated. By demonstrating
the impact that the demands of these competing roles placed on
Huntington, as well as highlighting the ways in which his contributions
to strategic debate were shaped by his broader political and intellectual
preferences, this essay seeks to contribute not only to the history of this
era but also to an understanding of the role and experience of the strate-
gist more broadly.4
Samuel Huntington and political order
Born in 1927 in New York City, Huntington was a product of elite American
institutions of learning. He attended Yale, the University of Chicago, and
finally Harvard, where he completed his doctoral dissertation in 1951. His
thesis examined policymaking in the federal bureaucracy and was the
beginning of Huntington’s lifelong interest in the intricacies of strategy
and policy. The practical details of policy continued to preoccupy him,
especially in his approach to the issue of Vietnam, even as the war was
seen as primarily a moral issue on college campuses. After joining the
faculty at Harvard, he published his first book, The Soldier and the State,
which ended with praise for ‘the military values’ of ‘loyalty, duty, restraint,
dedication’. The values of West Point – which he famously described as ‘a bit
of Sparta in the midst of Babylon’ – were the values that needed
4Note that while the Samuel Huntington Papers in the Harvard University Archives were consulted in
the course of researching this paper, there was little material there which shed any light either on
Huntington’s private views on the topics discussed in this essay or his academic and policy views on
the Vietnam War. Huntington wrote extensively on the Vietnam War for public, academic and
governmental audiences, and the archives did not contain substantive unpublished material.
Instead, the folders on Vietnam mainly consist of primary and secondary sources collected in the
course of Huntington’s research.
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emphasising during the Cold War, he argued.5 After a spell at Columbia
University, Huntington returned to Harvard in 1962 and became chairman of
its Department of Government later in the decade.
It was through the academy that Huntington developed his interest in
strategic issues, and the intellectual milieu in which they were considered. By
the mid-1960s, Huntington’s research interests shifted to focus on what he
initially called the problem of ‘political development’ in the Third World and its
implications for U.S. security policy. This was the genesis of the work that
eventually became his 1968 opus Political Order in Changing Societies, and of
themes that ran through his work for decades. This book, his report to the
Trilateral Commission in 1975 on the ‘crisis of democracy’ in America, and his
1981 book American Politics: The Promise of Disharmony – which was based on
ideas he had conceived in the mid-1970s, and delayed because of his time
serving in the Carter administration – were unified by a concern with the
problem of political authority in both the developed and developing world,
and particularly the maintenance of what he called ‘political order’.6
At the time, the dominant discourse on these issues – and one which would
have an influence over the development of U.S. strategy towards the develop-
ing world – was modernisation theory. Proponents of modernisation theory
such as Daniel Bell, Gabriel Almond, Lucian Pye and Walt Rostow sought what
historian Michael Latham calls a ‘universal model of global change’ that would
allow for an understanding of developments in the decolonising states in Asia,
Africa and Latin America in the 1950s and 1960s. Modernisation theorists
provided a comforting vision in which the new states would experience social,
economic and political development that would inevitably make them more
like the West. All good things would go together in what Lerner called a
‘consistent whole’. Social, economic and political change – urbanisation, indus-
trialisation, secularisation, democratisation, education andmedia participation –
would all occur at once. Furthermore, they would be unidirectional, ushering
the new states onto a higher plateau where they could bask in the glow of
modernity along with the West.7
AlthoughHuntington has sometimes been seen as at least a partial advocate
of modernisation theory, in reality he rejected its core premises, as his writing
on Vietnam would show.8 In particular, he was opposed to its view of mutually
5Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the State (Cambridge, MA, 1957), 465.
6Robert D. Putnam, ‘Samuel P. Huntington’, PS: Political Science & Politics 19, 4 (1986), 841; Samuel P.
Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1968);
Huntington, American Politics: The Promise of Disharmony (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1981), vii–viii.
7Michael Latham, The Right Kind of Revolution: Modernization, Development, and U.S. Foreign Policy from
the Cold War to the Present (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011), 44; Daniel Lerner, The Passing
of Traditional Society (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1958), 438.
8For more on Huntington’s critique of modernization theory, see Nils Gilman, Mandarins of the Future:
Modernization Theory in Cold War America (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 2003),
228–34.
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reinforcing progress in the social, economic and political spheres. Instead, he
staked out a claim for an autonomous political realm which could stagnate or
regress as well as develop. While he did not entirely reject the dichotomy of
modern versus traditional which themodernisation theorists had pioneered, he
introduced new categories of analysis. Central to his analysis was the concept of
a ‘praetorian society’, one in which social and economic change had vastly
outstripped the ability of a country’s political institutions to cope. Taking social
and economic change in the developing countries as given, he believed that it
inevitably led to the creation of new social forces which would make demands
on the political system. If a country lacked political institutions capable of
integrating these social forces, or failed to develop them, then a country’s
political order could collapse. Without institutions capable of mediating social
conflict in a rational and controlled manner, then naked social forces would
confront each other. Riots, coups and revolution would be the result. Political
stability, he hence claimed, could actually be undermined by rapid social and
economic change, hence implying that the latter were not unalloyed goods.
‘Rapid modernization, in brief’, he wrote, ‘produces not political development,
but political decay’.9
Huntington viewed this situation with alarm because he believed in the
primacy of political order over all other goods in the process of develop-
ment. ‘The most important political distinction between countries concerns
not their form of government but their degree of government’, he wrote in
the first sentence of Political Order in Changing Societies. While modernisa-
tion theorists had seen the process of modernisation as a liberal antidote to
Marxist models of development, Huntington’s own theory was ecumenical
about the sources of political order. In his view, one of the striking reasons
for the success of Communism in the developing countries was precisely
because their Leninist heritage gave Communists a keen sense of the need
to develop and maintain the authority of political institutions which
mediated between social forces and channelled their energies to the state’s
purposes. ‘Organization is the road to political power’, he noted, ‘but it is
also the foundation of political stability and thus the precondition of poli-
tical liberty’. Following in the Great Consensus tradition of Louis Hartz,
whom greatly influenced him in his time at Harvard, Huntington believed
that their history of limited social conflict and weak government had meant
that Americans tended to lack an appreciation of the fact that authority had
to be created before it could be limited. As such they could not understand
‘the organizational imperative’ in the developing countries, believing
instead that social and economic change would naturally lead to political
development and stability there too. In fact, without the cultivation of
authoritative political institutions, these countries would be left in a political
9Huntington, ‘Political Development’, 386.
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chaos that would leave no hope for social or economic development
either.10
The fault Huntington detected in the modernisation theorists was what
he called ‘“Webbism”: that is, the tendency to ascribe to a political system
qualities which are assumed to be its ultimate goals rather than qualities
which actually characterize its processes and functions’.11 He tried to edu-
cate his fellow citizens out of this tendency. As his activities would show, he
believed there was a role for academic expertise to play in the making of
specific policies in the government bureaucracy – especially when the
academic in question was realistic about political power and not a
Webbist. He rejected an ‘adversarial role’ for intellectuals and embraced a
technocratic and ‘policy-oriented’ one.12
Huntington’s views, like the work of the modernisation theorists, read as
a heuristic to help Americans understand the developing countries after
decolonisation. It was a conservative answer to what he saw as the liberal
dreams of the modernisation theorists, who he castigated as filling their
writings with an ‘air of hopeful unreality’.13 But beyond the academy,
Huntington’s writings also had a strategic message. If he was right and
the modernisation theorists were wrong, then a policy based on spreading
social and economic ‘development’ throughout the world would actually
spread instability. As well as standing as a repudiation of many of the
intellectual tenets of U.S. nation-building and counter-insurgency strategy
more broadly, Huntington’s views on ‘development’ and ‘modernization’
also had very direct implications for the most burning issue in
U.S. strategy in the late 1960s. That issue was the Vietnam War.
Political order and the Vietnam War
In Spring 1967, Huntington travelled to South Vietnam for 6 weeks to carry
out research for a report entitled ‘Political Stability and Security in South
Vietnam’ at the request of the Policy Planning Council of the State
Department. The report was completed in December 1967. Although the
Policy Planning Council was a bureaucratic backwater, the distribution list
for the report shows that copies were eventually sent to a range of top
officials. These included Walt Rostow, then National Security Advisor, George
Carver – who was the special assistant for Vietnam affairs to CIA director
Richard Helms – and the head of the State Department’s East Asia section,
William P. Bundy. The State Department’s intelligence branch, the Bureau of
10Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, 1, 461, 93–139, 460.
11Ibid., 35.
12Michael J. Crozier, Samuel P. Huntington and Joji Watanuki, The Crisis of Democracy: Report on the
Governability of Democracies to the Trilateral Commission (New York: New York University Press, 1975), 7.
13Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, 35.
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Intelligence and Research, also received a copy. Nor was distribution limited
to Washington – copies were soon winging their way overseas to Ellsworth
Bunker, the U.S. ambassador to South Vietnam, and Robert Komer, the head
of U.S. nation-building programme in the country.14
Huntington delivered a report that was sharply at odds with existing
U.S. strategy. He believed that the war had to have an essentially political
solution, and was critical of U.S. attempts to find one. This fact has tended to
be overshadowed by Huntington’s subsequent article in Foreign Affairs. But
what he wrote there was in fact sharply at variance with not only
Huntington’s 1967 report but also the relevant sections of Political Order in
Changing Societies and remarks which Huntington made during a June 1968
conference of scholars and policymakers.15
Huntington’s report ‘Political Stability and Security in South Vietnam’ was
in fact a subtle argument for the U.S. to abandon pretentions of nation-
building in South Vietnam and to cede a substantial role in the country’s
future to the National Liberation Front (NLF) U.S. officials recognised it as
such and hence rejected it. Huntington objected to the sweeping nature of
U.S. aspirations for nation-building in South Vietnam, believing instead they
should focus on the narrow question of political order. As he had ques-
tioned the modernisation theorists when they claimed to discern a process
of steadily increasing social, political and economic goods in the developing
countries, so he likewise questioned the pretensions of American nation-
builders in South Vietnam to provide that country with the same. The
criticism of ‘Webbism’ which he had levelled at these theorists was here
directed at the U.S. policymakers in Vietnam. What these policymakers
needed, Huntington felt, was an appreciation of how politics actually
worked in South Vietnam so that they could adapt their policy accordingly.
He hence set out to provide them with such an appreciation.
Huntington made clear at the outset that while – as the title suggested –
the report continued his concern with ‘political stability’, he did not view the
contest between America’s non-Communist allies and the Vietnamese
Communists to establish a durable political system in South Vietnam dis-
passionately. The ecumenism about the sources of stability which charac-
terised Huntington’s other work on political order was hence absent here.
While he noted in his report that ‘a Viet Cong victory might produce a high
level of political stability in South Vietnam’, he added that it would ‘probably
not be in the interest of the United States to promote stability through this
14Samuel P. Huntington, ‘Political Stability and Security in South Vietnam’, Dec. 1967, folder ‘Vietnam
1 C (2). Revolutionary Development program. 1 of 3’, Box 59, National Security File, Country File:
Vietnam, Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, unpaginated frontal note; Memo, ‘Distribution List for
Huntington Study’, folder ‘Sensitive documents – various subjects. [1 of 2]’, Box 24, idem.
15The conference proceedings were published as Richard M. Pfeffer, ed., No More Vietnams? The War
and the Future of American Foreign Policy (New York: Harper and Row, 1968).
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means’. While pointing out that the NLF had achieved a high degree of
‘political stability’ in areas they controlled, Huntington introduced another
concept with which he would concern himself in this report: ‘security’.
Security was defined as ‘the absence of Viet Cong political control and
military activity’, and was a higher good for U.S. policymakers than mere
stability, which could be brought about by NLF control. The question then
became how to promote a stability which was also secure, that is, existed in
the absence of the NLF. Huntington seemed to suggest that the historic
forces he would soon identify in his seminal work could be overcome or at
least contained through U.S. action in pursuit of this goal; indeed, for the
success of U.S. policy, they had to be. For this policy, Huntington made clear,
was not going well at the time of his writing in 1967. ‘Since the late 1950s’,
he wrote, ‘South Vietnamese governments have attempted to promote rural
security by pacification, that is, through the extension of the administrative,
military, and physical presence of the government into the countryside. The
pre-1965 efforts failed. The current effort is similar in concept but much
larger in scope than earlier efforts. It may succeed where the others failed.
But there is, as yet, little if any evidence that it is bringing about significant
and permanent increases in rural security’.16
Huntington then turned his attention to critiquing the Revolutionary
Development (RD) programme which the Government of Vietnam (GVN)
was carrying out with U.S. support in South Vietnam. The basis of the RD
programme was a 37-strong team of pro-government cadre that was dis-
patched into villages and hamlets to identify local needs and then bring
social and economic goods to the citizens of South Vietnam on behalf of the
GVN. They were supposed to displace traditional village and hamlets elders
and instead introduce a dynamic presence directed by the central govern-
ment. Loosely modelled on the Communist cadre system, the programme’s
successes paled in comparison to the NLF’s work at political organisation.
Often poorly trained and unwelcome in the rural areas, the RD cadre had a
high attrition rate and observers frequently believed they did more harm
than good. Huntington likewise believed that far from being a force for
good, the RD programme undermined traditional authority structures in the
Vietnamese countryside. By aiming to bring about a ‘revolution’ which
would displace the existing village leadership while remaining within non-
Communist limits, the U.S. would inevitably lose out the real revolutionaries
in Vietnam: the Communists. Undermining the existing institutions of poli-
tical order with no sure strategy for building a new one would play right
into the hands of the NLF. Huntington believed this was an inevitable
outcome of the RD programme because even had the programme worked
on its own terms, ‘improvements in security produced by the introduction of
16Huntington, ‘Political Stability’, i, ii, 1–2, 8–20.
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a governmental presence last only so long as the presence lasts’. Noting that
the United States and GVN did not have ‘sufficient military forces, adminis-
trative personnel, or RD cadres to saturate the entire countryside simulta-
neously’, Huntington concluded that ‘pacification by itself cannot produce
comprehensive or lasting rural security’.17
Having rejected the idea that the U.S. and GVN’s strategy of pacification
could lead to improved security, Huntington next turned to analyse the
areas of South Vietnam which were already secure. Rather than vainly trying
to bring security to the whole country, Huntington suggested, the United
States should look at areas where security actually existed and capitalise
upon it. He suggested two such areas. The first were the cities. He claimed
that the substantial rate of urbanisation which had been evident in South
Vietnam since the Americanisation of the war was the single factor most
responsible for increasing security in the country. The urban population of
the country had doubled from 3 to 6 million between 1962 and 1965. This
was mostly due to the ‘push’ factor of widespread destruction caused by the
U.S. and GVN combat operations, and the ‘pull’ factor of increased economic
opportunities in the cities associated with the American presence. NLF
violence was also a factor. Huntington noted, as many observers did, the
inability of the NLF to gain a foothold in the cities of South Vietnam. This
factor had led South Vietnam’s larger urban areas to be fairly free of the
travails of war up until 1967, contributing to their appeal for refugees from
rural areas. Yet Huntington did not believe that rapid urbanisation was a
panacea for bringing political stability to South Vietnam. Noting that
increased social and economic discontent in the urban areas would make
them more susceptible to sympathising with the NLF, he noted also that the
lack of political organisation in urban slums stored up deep problems for
future stability. Although not an immediate problem, he claimed that
demands from the cities for social and economic goods would explode
‘with potentially disastrous consequences for the political stability of the
future’. Further, the South Vietnamese political system would be unable to
meet these demands unless it had already ‘established reasonably effective
control in the countryside’. As in Political Order in Changing Societies, he
placed paramount importance on the rural population and their support for
the incumbent government, not the population of the cities.18
Huntington hence did not, as critics would later assert, advocate that the
U.S. military power be used to forcibly urbanise South Vietnam in a bid to
control the population. The focus of his report was on the rural population
of South Vietnam, not its urban population; the chapter on urbanisation
comes early in the report, as a factor to be considered before moving onto
17Ibid., iii, 8–10.
18Ibid., 5–7, 21–7, 32–3, 39–43.
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the meat of the analysis. When Komer said in response to the report that
urbanisation was indeed part of the solution in Vietnam, Huntington
expressed disagreement with Komer’s comments and summarised what he
held to be the four ‘basic propositions’ of his report, not mentioning
urbanisation once. Responses to the paper written by other figures in the
national security bureaucracy – including White House aide Hans Heymann,
the chief of USAID’s Vietnam bureau and the interagency Vietnam Working
Group – likewise did not focus on urbanisation.19
These officials were much more exercised by what Huntington went on
to say in his paper. Having dismissed the current U.S. strategy for nation-
building, and similarly dismissed urbanisation as only storing up problems
for later, Huntington moved on to lay out his own proposals for a
U.S. political strategy in South Vietnam. His ideas were Burkean in inspiration
and limited in their scope. Rather than attempting to engineer widespread
change in a foreign society, Huntington proposed that the U.S. largely take
South Vietnamese society as it found it and try to build a coalition out of
existing elements. This meant building political power upwards from institu-
tions which already existed in the villages rather than downwards through
nationwide programmes such as RD. As these institutions included the NLF,
which had by 1967 administered parts of South Vietnam for decades, the
coalition would not be entirely anti-Communist. ‘Through pacification and
urbanization’, he critiqued, ‘the United States is trying to create a second
revolution in South Vietnam to rival that of the Viet Cong. Instead of trying
to destroy the Viet Cong by destroying traditional authority structures, the
United States would do far better to promote accommodations with both’.20
Huntington proposed that the United States and GVN should abandon
their attempt to use scant resources and unsound concepts to extend the
central government’s reach through RD cadre, and should instead reach
agreements with existing local authorities in which the central government
would largely leave them alone if they would keep the Communists out. He
was particularly impressed by the rural political organisation which he found
to already exist among the many ethno-religious minorities in South
Vietnam, who tended to be strongly anti-Communist and produced lasting
rural security in their own areas. He suggested that the United States and
GVN could not expect to build national loyalties through programmes such
as the RD cadre, but should instead capitalise on pre-existing communal
loyalties. His passages recall Edmund Burke’s statement of his own conser-
vative philosophy: ‘To be attached to the subdivision, to love the little
platoon we belong to in society, is the first principle (the germ as it were)
19Memo, ‘Comments by Komer on Huntington report, 3 January 1968, folder ‘Vietnam 1 C (2).
Revolutionary Development program. 2 of 3‘, Box 59, NSF Country File: Vietnam, LJBL; Memo,
Huntington to Owen, 15 January 1968, ibid., 3.
20Huntington, ‘Political Stability’, 78.
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of public affections. It is the first link in the series by which we proceed
towards a love to our country, and to mankind’.21 Huntington suggested
more prosaically that communal loyalties could be the ‘building blocks of
national loyalty’.22 Likewise, he suggested that the NLF be allowed to keep
their local organisations intact in areas they had long controlled, so long as
they agreed to live within the national framework set by the GVN and
participate in elections. They would even be allowed to send Communist
representatives to the National Assembly.23
The U.S. officials who read Huntington’s report rightly recognised its
inconsistency with their own approach. The Vietnam Working Group felt
that, given time, the RD programme could work. By Huntington’s own
admission, some 35% of the population was not organised into ethno-
religious groups who were able to provide security in their own areas –
why, asked the Vietnam Working Group, abandon them to the NLF?24 The
answer was, of course, because unlike the Vietnam Working Group,
Huntington had lost faith in the U.S. nation-building programmes ever
successfully reaching them. Heymann and James Grant, another USAID
official involved in Vietnam policy, had another critique. They pointed out
that local NLF organisations would be unlikely to reach an accommodation
with the GVN for so long as they retained the extensive military support of
North Vietnam. How, they asked, did Huntington propose that North
Vietnam be persuaded to withdraw its forces from the South?25 In his report,
Huntington had specifically opposed the further intensification of
U.S. military activity in South Vietnam. He opposed sending U.S. combat
units to the Mekong Delta, an area which had not yet seen a large-scale
U.S. troop presence. Huntington believed that intensive U.S. military action
‘contributes to future political instability’ because it depopulated the rural
areas, including ones which already had local political organisation based on
ethno-religious groups. Refugees streaming into atomised and chaotic
urban slums due to military action were part of the problem, not part of
the solution, and he did not want the process repeated in the Delta. Instead,
the U.S. needed to change the ‘scope and nature’ of its presence in
Vietnam – by which he meant, demilitarise it.26 Officials who had not yet
given up on ‘RD’ or on militarily defeating the Communists without com-
pletely destroying the country in the process were naturally puzzled by this
21Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France. Edited by J. C. D. Clark (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 2001), 202.
22Huntington, ‘Political Stability’, 47.
23Huntington, ‘Political Stability’, 44–52, 74.
24Memo, ‘Critique of Huntington’, undated, folder ‘Vietnam 1 C (2). Revolutionary Development
program. 2 of 3’, Box 59, NSF Country File: Vietnam, LJBL.
25Memo, Heymann to Leonheart, 13 January 1968, folder ‘Sensitive documents – various subjects. [1 of
2]’, Box 24, NSF: Komer-Leonhart File, Lyndon Baines Johnson Library; Memo, Grant to Yager,
31 January 1968, folder ‘Vietnam 1 C (3)–B2. Revolutionary Development program’, Box 60, ibid.
26Huntington, ‘Political Stability’, 78.
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advice. At least one of them thought he knew how to resolve the puzzle. ‘I’m
afraid Huntington has allowed his judgment as a political scientist to be
swayed by his less-than-enthusiastic emotions toward the war’, remarked
Heymann.27
Huntington’s view on U.S. strategy in Vietnam was hence sharply critical.
He rejected the current U.S. approach to nation-building, believed an inten-
sification of military action futile and wanted the United States and GVN to
reach an accommodation with the NLF. In contrast to Vietnam policymakers
and future neoconservatives, he did not believe it was wise for the United
States to attempt a sweeping reorganisation of a foreign society.
Huntington amplified this point in June 1968, when he stated at an aca-
demic conference that ‘few phenomena are more unsettling in their con-
sequences than masses of energetic and high-minded Americans intent on
doing good’. While officials called their approach ‘revolutionary’, he called
his one ‘accommodation’. It meant taking Vietnam as the United States
found it, not as the United States might wish it would be. What many official
readers no doubt found disturbing was that Huntington appeared to offer
no sure path to victory; if pacification didn’t work, and military action didn’t
work, then all there was to do was to hope a suitable accommodation could
be reached. If it could not, it was clear that there might be no way to
achieve the U.S. goals in Vietnam. The report was, in effect, a call for de-
escalation. It is no wonder that one official who read it was reported to have
remarked: ‘If this study is right, then everything we’re doing is wrong’.28
Indeed, much of what was written in Huntington’s seminal 1968 book
seemed to urge caution onto the pretensions of American nation-builders.
The first thing that is notable about Political Order in Changing Societies in
this context is how few direct references to Vietnam it contains. Those which
do exist overwhelmingly praise the Vietnamese Communists for their orga-
nisational efforts while denigrating America’s non-Communist allies.
Huntington’s concern with an autonomous political realm which must be
understood separately to the social and economic spheres allowed him to
praise the Vietnamese Communists for building a stable political system
while acidly noting the failures of America’s non-Communist Vietnamese
allies to do the same. He included the Vietnamese Revolution among a list
of the ‘great revolutions’, meaning that it resulted in the emergence of a
party with ‘deep roots’ among the Vietnamese population. North Vietnam,
he continued, showed the ‘effectiveness of the Leninist model’ in creating
‘well-organized, broadly based, complex political systems’. Meanwhile, he
said all that had been achieved in South Vietnam was an ‘unstable, frac-
tured, narrowly based personalistic regime’. He included South Vietnam in a
27Memo, Heymann to Leonheart, 13 January 1968.
28Pfeffer, No More Vietnams? 225; Putnam, ‘Samuel P. Huntington’, 843.
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list of countries where not only different governments but also different
forms of government followed each other in ‘bewildering array’ due to the
country’s lack of political maturity and the inability of its political elites to
put down roots among the population. At a time when Johnson adminis-
tration spokesmen were effusive in their praise of South Vietnam as a
nascent democracy and ascribed Vietnamese Communist support almost
entirely to coercion and terrorism, these remarks showed intellectual hon-
esty and a commitment to the empirical study of politics. They were sharply
opposed to the normative approach which Huntington accused the moder-
nisation theorists of following – along with, he might have added but didn’t,
hopeful U.S. Government officials.29
The dissonance is even more apparent when we move from considering
the comments he addressed directly towards Vietnam to consider his wider
theory. The core of Huntington’s argument in Political Order in Changing
Societies is that the key to the political stability and development of the non-
Western world lay in the mobilisation of the rural population into the
political system. Social and economic change would inevitably lead to the
emergence of new classes who made demands for political participation.
Their desire for participation could be satisfied by the gradual reform of the
existing political system, or through a revolution. If the country’s existing
political system could not reform itself, then revolution was inevitable. He
noted that while it was possible for foreign military intervention to crush a
revolution, it usually provoked greater mobilisation by the indigenous revo-
lutionary movement against the foreign invader and the traditional political
system which the invader was trying to defend. While the passages dealing
with this issue are not specifically addressed to the Vietnam case study, their
relevance is obvious. It was clear in South Vietnam that the Communists
were the ones successfully mobilising the rural masses into politics, and that
America’s non-Communist allies were not. As if to drive the point home,
Huntington closed Political Order in Changing Societies by quoting Lenin’s
views on party organisation approvingly.30
What Huntington was now urging on U.S. officials in his report was the
abandonment of its own efforts to ‘revolutionize’ Vietnam and a pact with
the very same traditional authority structure which had thus far failed to
meet the Communist challenge. Yet any such pact was surely Faustian,
purchasing temporary stability at the expense of the long-term develop-
ment of a responsive non-Communist political system capable of producing
political order in a changing society. Without such a system, victory was not
possible. It was the very weakness and inability of this system to meet the
Communist challenge which had led to U.S. intervention in the first place; it
29Huntington, Political Order, 81–2, 275, 315, 343.
30Ibid., 72–8, 291–308, 433–461.
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surely could not now, after being weakened even further by years of war, be
expected to do any better.
Huntington’s seminal work on the politics of the non-Western world hence
seemed on the face of it to be hostile to the American nation-building project in
South Vietnam and openly solicitous towards the Communist cause. If organi-
sation was the road to liberty and it was clear who was most successfully
organising the Vietnamese population, then it should have been equally clear
that in this case the road to Vietnamese liberty lay through Hanoi and not
Washington. Yet Huntington declined to draw this conclusion explicitly, and
declined to break openly from the administration on Vietnam War policy.
Although he seemed to consider the war intractable, Huntington’s commit-
ment to realism and to practical policy led him to focus in his confidential
report on minimising the harm from it and seeking the best outcome possible.
Yet all of this seems inconsistent with the fact that he never went public with
his doubts, and that in fact he continued to make optimistic statements about
the war which earned him the ire of anti-war activists and his fellow academics.
One reason for the animus Huntington generated was that his public positions
and statements often obfuscated the complex analysis of the war that he had
laid out in his writings. By his own admission, he supported the administration’s
war strategy from 1965 to 1967. ‘My view on the war shifted as a result of being
out there’, Huntington later recalled of his trip to Vietnam in 1967. ‘It just
seemed tomeweweren’t going to win it’.31 The analysis of the report provided
in this section bears out this recollection. It also bears out the fact that
Huntington’s primary concern was with the practicality of U.S. victory in
Vietnam, not any underlying moral issue. At the June 1968 academic confer-
ence, he recalled that in 1965 he had seen ‘good political andmoral grounds for
escalation in Vietnam’. What had seemed to change in the meanwhile was his
view on the practicality of the intervention, as he implied when he added that
the outcome was ‘a useful reminder that results are all that count’.32 Yet still
Huntington declined to go into open opposition to the administration’s poli-
cies. The key to understanding why lies in his concern for political order in the
United States during the turmoil of the Vietnam War era.
Political order in the United States
Huntington’s reticence to break publicly from the administration’s policy or
to provide a council of despair is remarkable. His own report did not draw
the obvious conclusions from his own analysis that the war was unwinnable.
A keen student of bureaucratic politics, he knew that to provide such an
analysis was to follow many an internal dissenter down the path to
31Appy, Patriots, 320.
32Quoted in Pfeffer, No More Vietnams? 3.
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irrelevance. Even when he returned from Vietnam in summer 1967, he
remarked to a Harvard Crimson journalist that ‘[i]t’s not hopeless by a long
shot’, and that he believed that North Vietnam could still be forced to
withdraw its forces from the South without any further U.S. escalation.33
His report, submitted 2 months after this interview, strongly suggested
otherwise. The same unwillingness to be gloomy about the war also under-
lay the trouble he experienced as a result of his July 1968 article in Foreign
Affairs, published only a month after Huntington stood before an academic
audience and called the war ‘a horrible mistake’. In this article, Huntington
summarised many parts of his 1967 report. He again spoke about urbanisa-
tion and accommodation, including with the NLF. While he mentioned that
urbanisation caused by U.S. firepower stored up political problems for the
future, he made a much stronger claim in favour of it than he had in his
confidential report. In the passage that moved Chomsky to consider the
U.S. ripe for denazification, Huntington wrote:
In an absent-minded way the United States in Viet Nam may well have
stumbled upon the answer to ‘wars of national liberation.’ The effective
response lies neither in the quest for conventional military victory nor in the
esoteric doctrines and gimmicks of counter-insurgency warfare. It is instead
forced draft urbanization and modernization which rapidly brings the country
in question out of the phase in which a rural revolutionary movement can
hope to generate sufficient strength to come to power.34
Huntington would later claim that the passage in Foreign Affairs was
‘descriptive’ and that he ‘wasn’t advocating’ forced urbanisation. On the
contrary, he said, he was simply pointing out that problems would be
caused by urbanisation and that ‘it was a fact we ought to come to terms
with’.35 Yet it is hard to read his passage referring to urbanization as the
‘answer’ to America’s travails in Vietnam in this way. The article appeared at
the very least to be making a case for an optimistic view of current events in
Vietnam, based on urbanisation which had already taken place. In another
article in The Boston Globe which prefigured the one in Foreign Affairs,
Huntington tried to present the Tet Offensive of January 1968 in just such
a positive light. The article purported to explain ‘why [the] Viet Cong
attacked the cities’, and its answer was that they realised urbanisation was
depriving them of rural support and that the cities were the new battle-
ground. ‘The United States is urbanizing the people of South Vietnam’, he
wrote. ‘The Viet Cong must urbanize the fighting or they will lose the people
and then lose the war’.36
33The Harvard Crimson, 17 October 1967.
34Samuel P. Huntington, ‘The Bases of Accommodation’, Foreign Affairs, 46 (July 1968), 652.
35Christopher G., Appy, Patriots: The Vietnam War Remembered from all Sides (New York: Penguin, 2004),
320.
36The Boston Globe, 17 February 1968, 6.
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These views were clearly inconsistent with Huntington’s own detailed
writings on both the Vietnam War and his theoretical work, which was
analysed in the previous section of this essay. As Huntington had argued
previously, neither the bomb-scarred and depopulated village nor the urban
slum could be the basis of political order. Huntington seemed to have
picked up that ‘same air of hopeful unreality’ for which he had criticised
an earlier generation of development theorists. An explanation has to be
found for why Huntington continued to refuse to break publicly from
administration policy and continued to refuse to draw the obvious conclu-
sions from his own work on Vietnam. This explanation can be found in
Huntington’s notion of committed scholarship, and particularly how this
related to the general domestic and international crisis in the Vietnam
War era.
Huntington’s experience of hostility towards authority during these years
was not just theoretical, but personal. His public support for the Johnson
administration and refusal to criticise its Vietnam policy made him a target
of hostility by both his fellow academics and their students. Even before the
issue became an all-consuming one in American politics, Huntington’s posi-
tion was marked by a support of administration policy which made him
stand out in the academic milieu of the time. This support persisted despite
very early doubts about the possibility of U.S. victory in the conflict. In an
address to the Society of Fellows at Harvard in February 1965, he said that
the United States was only ‘delaying defeat’ and could not win because it
had not realized that the revolution in Vietnam was ‘less a war than a
political campaign for the support of the disaffected masses’.37 Yet in the
same talk Huntington backed the administration’s current policy, which he
saw as one of trying to stop the conflict escalating from a guerrilla struggle
to open warfare. This was consistent with Huntington’s earlier views on the
U.S. military intervention in internal conflicts overseas. ‘Military intervention
is to domestic war what massive retaliation is to interstate war’, he had
written in 1961. ‘A weapon of last resort, its use is a confession of political
failure. When the Marines are called for, the war is lost or close to being
lost’.38 Yet when Johnson called for the Marines and dispatched them to
South Vietnam in March 1965, Huntington submerged his doubts and stuck
by the administration.
Many in the academic community had the opposite reaction to the
process of escalation which began in mid-1965. As the war dragged on, it
came under increasing attack from both academics and students on college
campuses. Huntington went on the offensive against these intellectual
37The Harvard Crimson, 19 February 1965.
38S. P. Huntington, Instability at the Non-Strategic Level of Conflict (Washington, D.C.: Institute for
Defence Analysis, 1961), 37.
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critics of the administration, warning in a petition jointly circulated with a
Harvard colleague in January 1966 that their dissent boosted the confidence
of China and North Vietnam. Huntington was clearly beginning to feel
alienated from the academic community, and throughout the war he
would continue to characterise their open dissent as irresponsible.39
As U.S. involvement in Vietnam deepened, Huntington not only argued
that the academic community should refrain from criticising a war that
many had come to regard as immoral and harmful to American interests.
He also attempted to mobilise scholars to directly aid the U.S. war effort by
placing their expertise at the government’s disposal. Huntington’s interest in
political order and scepticism about a purely military solution to the conflict
caused him to turn his attention to the U.S. nation-building effort in South
Vietnam, and how scholarly expertise might be placed in its service. In an
article in the academic journal Asian Survey in 1967, Huntington criticised
what he called the ‘shrillness and superficiality’ of the public debate over
American policy towards South Vietnam. He noted that America’s involve-
ment in Vietnam had ‘developed in the absence of any significant familiarity
with the country, its history, its people and its culture’. He accordingly felt
there was a ‘major national need’ to develop ‘scholarly study and under-
standing of Vietnam’ and this could only be done if the analytic capabilities
of American political scientists, ethnographers and economists were
brought to bear on the problem. His concerns were not for the study of
‘current history and the analysis of immediate policy problems’, but rather
for a deeper understanding of the country. As a result, Huntington felt it was
unfortunate that in his estimation ‘well over ninety percent of the serious
social science research done on Vietnam is being conducted under the
auspices of the United States Government’. Deriving their authority from
superior expertise and independent objectivity, the academics who
answered his call would nevertheless still be serving the purposes of the
U.S. Government. He was also critical of ‘the existence of a widespread
feeling among many university administrators and academics that Vietnam
was a “government problem” that independent scholars should avoid’. His
concept of a scholarship which was independent yet attuned to the needs
of America’s political institutions was hence embodied thoroughly in his
call.40
The vehicle through which Huntington attempted to mobilise the aca-
demic community to study Vietnam was the Council on Vietnamese Studies,
part of the Southeast Asia Development Advisory Group (SEADAG).
Huntington was the chairman of this council from 1966 to 1969. The aim
39Melvin Small, Johnson, Nixon and the Doves (New Brunswick, 1988), 25; The Boston Globe,
19 January 1966, 2.
40Samuel P. Huntington, ‘Introduction: Social Science and Vietnam’, Asian Survey, 7 (August 1967), 504,
503, 505.
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of the council was to raise funds to promote the study of Vietnam. The
group also organised conferences and seminars at which research on
Vietnam could be discussed, including at least one of the major reports
that Huntington prepared for government officials. The interests of its
participants in influencing policy led Chomsky to remark of one contribution
to a SEADAG seminar that ‘the contents are at the level of scholarly neu-
trality, objectivity and insight that one would expect from a colonial admin-
istrator concerned with pacification’.41 Huntington, though, was
disappointed with the success of the Council on Vietnamese Studies,
remarking in respone to Chomsky’s criticism that it had been only ‘moder-
ately successful’ in raising funds for research into Vietnam. He also added
that far from influencing government policy in the manner that Chomsky
asserted, it was ‘almost a year before any Vietnam expert in the State
Department could muster enough interest in the Council to show up at
one of our meetings’.42 By 1971, 2 years after Huntington’s tenure at the
Council on Vietnamese Studies ended, there remained only ten PhD candi-
dates pursuing Vietnamese studies in the U.S. universities. The council
seemed to have failed in its mission, and Huntington’s hope that the
wider academic community would marshal its resources in service of
American foreign policy had not come to pass.43
At the same time, these activities made Huntington a target of the anti-
war movement. Student activists at Harvard believed that Huntington not
only had influence in the national security state but was instrumental in
designing its policies, and they targeted him accordingly. In April 1969,
students from the radical group students for a Democratic Society inter-
rupted one of Huntington’s lectures at Harvard and remonstrated with him,
accusing the professor of ‘being the architect of the U.S. pacification pro-
gram in Vietnam’. Huntington refused to engage with the disruptors and
called campus police to have them removed.44 When recalling some dec-
ades later the reasons for their strong stance against the professor, one of
the students involved in this action recalled that ‘Huntington’s political
science became so shackled to the immediate needs of the national security
state that many liberals found the distinction between the state and the
academy obliterated’.45 Another remembered that Huntington ‘earned the
sobriquet “Mad Dog” for his part in setting up the pacification program in
South Vietnam’.46 As well as class disruptions, Huntington suffered personal
harassment at his home. He recalled in an oral history interview how ‘[s]
41Noam Chomsky, For Reasons of State (New York, 2003), 268–9, 270.
42Samuel Huntington, ‘A Frustrating Task’, The New York Review of Books, 26 Feb. 1970.
43Putnam, ‘Samuel P. Huntington’, 842.
44The Boston Globe, 16 April 1969, 1, 14; The Boston Globe, 16 April 1969, 36.
45John Trumpbour, ‘Harvard, the Cold War, and the National Security State’ in John Trumpbour, ed.,
How Harvard Rules: Reason in the Service of Empire (Boston: South End Press, 1989), 108.
46Andrew Kopkind, ‘Living with the Bomb: The World according to Bok’ in ibid., 131.
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omebody came by and painted in big, black letters on our yellow door, “A
War Criminal Lives Here”’.47
Even at this considerable personal cost, Huntington stuck to his concep-
tion of the role that a responsible, patriotic intellectual should play in
national strategic debate. The febrile atmosphere in the United States as
protest against the war mounted both on and off campus, especially after
the Tet Offensive of January 1968, only increased his commitment to
defending the administration from criticism. Huntington believed that the
‘whole thrust’ of the wave of protest was ‘to devalue and diminish’ pre-
sidential authority, something he believed it important to defend.48 In part,
Vietnam became linked to his defence of the established order because he
feared the domestic consequences of a precipitous withdrawal. A lifelong
Democrat, Huntington was particularly concerned that a perceived
American defeat in Vietnam on Johnson’s watch would lead to a backlash
against his party. In 1967, he said that withdrawal would be followed by ‘an
incredibly strong rightist reaction that would make McCarthyism look like
pink tea’.49 In both his views about the importance of maintaining the
authority of the presidency and about the dangers of a right-wing backlash,
Huntington was remarkably close to Kissinger. After the invasion of
Cambodia, Kissinger voiced his own fears about U.S. political order in a
way that sounded remarkably similar to Huntington’s own warnings of the
dangers of a ‘praetorian society’ in which political institutions had lost their
authority and naked social forces confronted each other. In an extended
background briefing he warned about the dangers of ‘a rebellion against
authority of any kind … whether he be president of a university or the
President of the United States’. He added that when the authority of
legitimate institutions such as the presidency was destroyed, there would
be nothing left but ‘a physical test of strength’ between naked social forces.
‘Upper middle-class college kids are not going to take this country over’ in
such a situation, he remarked. ‘Some more primitive and elemental forces
will do that if it happens’.50
The travails of the United States in the late 1960s and early 1970s led
Huntington to extend both his analysis of the importance of political
authority and his attempt to educate his countrymen about the realities of
power to America’s own domestic situation. Like many conservative intel-
lectuals, Huntington found these years dizzying and troubling. A ‘democratic
surge’ challenged the authority of ‘the family, the university, business, public
and private associations, politics, the governmental bureaucracy, and the
military services’. Although Huntington doubtlessly felt the loss of his
47Appy, Patriots, 319.
48Huntington, American Politics, 135.
49The Harvard Crimson, 17 October 1967.
50Quoted in David Landau, Kissinger: The Uses of Power (New York: Robson, 1974), 130–1.
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authority as a university administrator and as an expert most personally of
all, it was the loss of authority of political institutions that worried him the
most. He worried that this development left the very governability of the
United States in doubt.51
In Huntington’s view, these years saw ‘[p]reviously passive or unorga-
nized groups in the population now embarked on concerted efforts to
establish their claim to opportunities, positions, rewards and privileges,
which they had not considered themselves entitled to before’. At the
same time as these increasing demands were being placed on America’s
political institutions, the efficacy of these institutions was declining as their
authority and legitimacy was questioned. The undermining of the presi-
dency, the country’s most important institution and the one that had
provided stable government in the post-war era, was particularly dispiriting
to Huntington. ‘“Who governs?”, is obviously one of the most important
questions to ask concerning any political system’, he wrote, echoing what he
had earlier written about the developing countries. ‘Even more important,
however, may be the question: “Does anybody govern?”’. The answer to the
question in the United States used to be that the president did, with the
support and cooperation of the executive agencies, Congress and important
private institutions. These institutions were now threatened, and the pre-
sidency was threatened most of all. Just as he had warned that developing
countries could see the pace at which social groups were mobilised into
politics race ahead of the capacity of political institutions to cope, the
political system of the United States likewise faced now faced too many
demands and insufficient means with which to cope with them. The pro-
spect of naked social forces confronting each other in a spiral of polarisation,
unmediated by political institutions, threatened. The result would be a
United States that was much like the ‘praetorian societies’ Huntington
analysed in his earlier work.52
Huntington’s concern with political order had come home. He believed
that the domestic turmoil of the Vietnam War era was one of the periodic
surges of ‘creedal passion’ in American history in which sufficient numbers
of people had become disillusioned by the gap between American ideals
and the realities of American life. Under this critical glare, America’s political
institutions were stripped of their ability to use ‘inescapable attributes of the
process of government’ such as ‘hierarchy, coercion, discipline, secrecy, and
deception’.53 The creedal passion would eventually wane, but in the mean-
time it threatened to do lasting damage to the institutions of politics.
Huntington saw his role in response to the democratic surge as being to
51Huntington, The Crisis of Democracy, 63, 75.
52Huntington et. al., The Crisis of Democracy, 61–2, 92; See also Huntington, American Politics, 33, 41, 86,
129, 135, 178, 180, 211.
53Huntington et. al., Crisis of Democracy, 93.
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use his expertise in the study of politics – the very expertise whose authority
he felt was questioned by the spirit of the times – to help educate his fellow
citizens about the realities of politics and to wean them away from what he
famously called ‘an excess of democracy’.54 The goal of his activities was to
attempt to combat what the authors of the Trilateral Commission report
jointly called the ‘Vietnamization’ of American politics.55
Huntington’s view of the role of the patriotic and responsible intellectual
explains both his provision of a telling critique of U.S. foreign policy to the
Johnson administration in private, and his continued defence of that same
policy in public. David Landau, a writer who interviewed numerous officials
in the national security state while writing a book about Kissinger, said that
many of them privately thought Huntington had praised urbanisation in
Foreign Affairs as a ‘tactical ploy designed to interest “hard-headed”
Washington officials’ in his calls for a political accord.56 Whether this is
true or not, Huntington certainly declined to become one of what he
would later characterise as the adversarial intellectuals of these years, and
instead took the path of technocracy. As an insider, he would provide his
expert advice with the discretion and secrecy that the government had
every right to command; to outsiders, he would defend the government
from criticism. Huntington’s erudite playing of the insider game eventually
landed him a job in the Carter White House in 1977. In this respect he again
resembled Kissinger, another Harvard academic who was privately but not
too loudly critical of the Vietnam War until he was called into government
service to help run it. Kissinger’s concerns about the impact of the war and
of the possibility of precipitous withdrawal on American society even led
him to answer the call of a man for whom he had previously professed no
great love, Richard Nixon. Huntington, likewise fearing the possibility of a
right-wing backlash if the U.S. withdrew precipitously from Vietnam, also
became increasingly involved in practical politics in 1968.
While Kissinger famously put his eggs in many baskets during the 1968
campaign, Huntington was loyal to oneman. After Johnson stated his intention
not to stand again for the presidency on 31 March, Vice-President Hubert
Humphrey threw his hat into the ring. Humphrey represented the mainstream
of the Democratic Party with which Huntington had always identified.
Huntington was no stranger to electoral politics, having written speeches for
Adlai Stevenson in 1956. During the course of the 1968 campaign, he became
the head of the Humphrey campaign’s task force on the Vietnam War.
Huntington defended Humphrey on the basis that he would seek a political
rather than a military solution to the fighting in Vietnam, an endorsement in
54Ibid., 113.
55Huntington et. al., Crisis of Democracy, 3.
56The Harvard Crimson, 15 February 1972.
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line with Huntington’s detailed analyses of the conflict. Huntington also drafted
a statement for Humphrey which called for the suspension of American bomb-
ing of North Vietnam as a bid to begin peace talks. Humphrey allowed Johnson
to veto the statement, and he did not make the call until 30 September.
Nevertheless, the candidate was impressed with Huntington and the latter
stuck with Humphrey. Humphrey, for his part, wrote later that he intended to
take Huntington with him into the White House. He also wanted to take
Kissinger, noting: ‘That Boston bunch is bright. I can understand why John
Kennedy used them’.57
The possibility of future service in the White House naturally also restricted
what Huntington could say about a crucial issue such as Vietnam during the
election year of 1968. While he could provide his expert advice to the candidate
in private, to publicly enter into an oppositional role as many intellectuals did
would have been to scupper his chances of entering the White House. Yet
nothing in his character or intellectual work leads us to believe that this was
simply craven opportunism; it was, in fact, a logical consequence of his views on
authority and the role that loyal experts could serve in reinforcing it. One liberal
who had joined Huntington in defence of the administration at a teach-in 1965
but had nowmoved into opposition dismissed these views with remarks which
typified liberal abhorrence with fellow intellectuals who continued to seek
involvement in the details of the Vietnam War. ‘Those Humphrey professors’,
said John Kenneth Galbraith, ‘are just a bunch of young and old fogeys who
consider the Vietnam War as simply a technical problem’.58
Having missed the opportunity to enter the White House, Huntington
was said to express ‘bitter disappointment’ at Humphrey’s defeat in 1968.59
As Huntington had taken a formal role in the Humphrey campaign, there
was no hope of a role for him in the Nixon White House. It is doubtful that
he would have shed his lifelong allegiance to the Democratic Party to accept
one, and he would only finally enter the White House along with Jimmy
Carter in 1977. After his service in the Humphrey campaign, Huntington
came to be seen as an outright dove in Nixon’s Washington.60 Although
Huntington was critical of Nixon on many matters, he later said that ‘I think
Humphrey would have done pretty much what Nixon did’ on Vietnam
policy.61 When the moratorium protests swept America in late 1969,
Huntington warned that protest would only embolden Hanoi and move
peace further away. Once again, he not only declined to join in dissent but
also condemned those who did.62
57Hubert H, Humphrey, The Education of a Public Man: My Life and Politics (Garden City, NY: Doubleday
1976), 9.
58Quoted in The Boston Globe, 28 June 1968, 17.
59Putnam, ‘Samuel P. Huntington’, 841.
60David Landau writing in the The Harvard Crimson, 15 February 1972.
61Appy, Patriots, 321.
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Furthermore, the remarkable correlation between Huntington’s concerns
and those of Nixon and Kissinger was recorded by Nixon’s ever-whirring tape
recorders. In a conversation in the Oval Office in 1971, Kissinger told Nixon
about how Huntington was under attack by anti-war students and faculty at
Harvard. His job, Kissinger said, was imperilled. ‘Isn’t that a shame?’ askedNixon,
who was keen to let it be known he had heard of the academic. He added later:
‘I hope he doesn’t go’. Their conversation continued, with Kissinger giving his
own expert view based on his authority ‘as a historian’ on the attempt by
‘radicals’ to break the authority of Harvard and of America’s institutions at large:
‘But, I think it’s the macrocosm [sic] of our society, Mr. President… the radicals
understand what they’re doing… they think the war is a magnificent opportu-
nity to break the self-confidence of this, of this country… [a]nd of the system’.
Their sympathy for Huntington was well placed, for it was precisely in fighting
this same battle to preserve the authority of America’s political institutions and
to avoid a precipitous withdrawal from Vietnam that he had gathered so many
enemies. Regardless of party, and whether viewed from the White House or
Harvard Yard, the defence of ‘political order’ during the VietnamWar era had its
own logic.63
Conclusion
This essay has shown that Huntington’s engagement in strategic debates
over the Vietnam War was more complex than has hitherto been believed.
On the other hand, he was much less influential than his radical critics
claimed. Indeed, the striking fact about his engagement in strategic debate
over the war was that, even on his own terms, it failed. His attempts to
influence public policy both through his confidential reports to the U.S.
Government and his involvement in the Humphrey campaign both failed.
At the same time, the price that Huntington paid in the esteem of his
academic colleagues was sizeable. Although his 1967 report constituted
one of the most reasoned critiques of the U.S. approach to nation-building
in South Vietnam, the fact it was delivered in secret and his own clumsy
defences of the administration robbed him of respect among those opposed
to the war. In a survey of intellectuals in the early 1970s asking them who
they considered the most influential thinker on the war, Huntington failed to
even make the top 20.64 Hence while he failed to ever gain appreciable
influence in the circles of power during this period, he alienated many of his
academic colleagues and students in the process. That the former held true
made it even more remarkable that he was willing to suffer the latter. As this
63Kisisnger and Nixon quoted in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–76 (51 vols., Washington,
DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003–2014), XII, no. 190.
64Charles Kadushin, The American Intellectual Elite (Boston: Little, Brown and Co, 1974), 188.
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essay has shown, it was in his attempts to balance the competing demands
of his roles as a government consultant, academic and public intellectual
that he became unstuck.
This essay has also demonstrated the interrelationship between
Huntington’s views on domestic political developments in the United
States and U.S. strategy abroad. A concern with ‘political order’ animated
both. Just as scholars have long pointed out U.S. counter-insurgency and
nation-building strategy draw on the intellectual lineage of modernisation
theory, Huntington’s critique also represented a particular world view which
was a product of its time. More conservative and realistic in its approach –
like Kissinger’s – and hence more attuned to the balancing of means and
ends which ultimately makes for successful strategy, the full details of
Huntington’s critique of U.S. strategy in Vietnam deserves to be pulled out
from under the shadow of the phrase ‘forced-draft urbanization’ and the
binders of classified reports. Like Kissinger, Huntington sought to encourage
a realistic balance between means and ends. Today, as counter-insurgency
and nation-building strategies continue to be inspired by the tenets of
modernisation and what Huntington called its ‘hopeful air of unreality’, his
critique of it deserves to continue to be heard. Hence by seeking to
contribute to a clearer understanding of Huntington’s role in strategic
debates over the Vietnam War, this essay also clears the way for a better
appreciation of his future relevance too.
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